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Book Reviews
By B. H.
Levy. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press,
1969. Pp. xi, 365. $9.95.
CARDOZO AND FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING.

This 117-page treatise on the life and judicial writings of Benjamin
Nathan Cardozo, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court
(1932-1938) is worthwhile reading for lawyer and layman alike. It is a
brief and comprehensive summary of Cardozo's philosophical approach
to law as illustrated in a selection of his opinions. The book also focuses
attention on the great body of law established by appellate judges in
the review of issues before them, revealing most vividly that changes
in the law are not made solely through the legislature. On this theme,
the author makes his point through the opinions of Cardozo.
Of course, when we speak of Cardozo, we speak of an Olympian
figure in the field of law. As Judge Cuthbert W. Pound, Cardozo's
colleague on the New York Court of Appeals, said of him: "The judge
should, no doubt, like our own great Chief Judge, be both lawyer and
philosopher of the highest grade, blessed with saving common sense
and practical experience as well as sound and comprehensive learning,
but such men are rare."
The book starts with a biographical sketch of Cardozo's early life.
Born in New York City on May 24, 1870, his ancestry in America
goes back to colonial times. His maternal great-grandfather, Benjamin
Mendes Seixas, helped drill Revolutionary troops. His great-greatuncle, Rabbi Gershom Mendes Seixas, participated in the inauguration
of George Washington. On the paternal side, we find his great-greatgrandfather, Aaron Nunez Cardozo, a merchant, arriving from London
in the middle of the 18th Century. The author opines that from this
background there was formed in Cardozo the best of the patriot-his
concern for the welfare of the states; the best of the businessmanhis sturdy grip on everyday realities; the best of the minister-his zeal
to actualize ideals.
In 1889 at the age of 19 Cardozo graduated from Columbia College.
His interest in governmental theory was well developed at this early
date with a commencement oration on "The Altruist in Politics" and
with a B.A. thesis on communism. A quick perusal of these early efforts
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reveals the deliberative and philosophical nature of Cardozo and his
concern for moral fundamentals which were characteristic of him
throughout his lifetime.
At the age of 20 he had earned a Master of Arts degree in political
science and after two years at the Columbia Law School, he was admitted to practice in'1891. It was not long before his arguments won
notice and his memory for cases became famous. He spent two decades
specializing in appellate practice.
Then, in November 1913, he was elected a Justice of the Supreme
Court in New York City in the course of the Fusion movement. Within
a month, and even though he had not served in the Appellate Division,
the intermediate court in New York, he was appointed by Governor
Glynn to serve temporarily as Associate Judge of the highest court in
the state, the Court of Appeals, when additional help was needed. The
governor had asked that court to name its candidate and Cardozo was
unanimously chosen. As the author notes, few are the lawyers whose
abilities are so outstanding that they have been drafted for high judicial office in this way. Later, Cardozo was appointed a regular member
of the Court, and in 1917 he was elected, running with joint endorsement of both parties. In 1927 he became Chief Judge of the Court.
In 1927 he declined an appointment to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at the Hague, but in 1932 came a more urgent call. President Hoover invited him to serve on the Supreme Court of the United
States because 'the whole country demanded the one man who could
best carry on the great Holmes tradition of a philosophical approach
to modern American Jurisprudence.' The appointment was unanimously confirmed by the Senate, which had subjected two of Hoover's
previous nominees to attack. On March 14, 1932 Cardozo took his place
on the Country's highest tribunal.
The author points out that Cardozo had always been at home in the
rarefied circles of the law. Cardozo displayed the meditative temper
of the appellate judge as far back as 1903 when he turned his scholastic attention upon the Court of Appeals and wrote a book on its
jurisdiction.
A clear understanding of Cardozo's approach to his work comes
from his own appraisal: "The submergence of self in pursuit of an
ideal, the readiness to spend oneself without measure, prodigally,
almost ecstatically, for something intuitively apprehended as great
and noble, spend oneself one knows not why-some of us like to
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believe that this is what religion means. True, I am sure, it is that
values such as these will be found to have survived when creeds are
shattered and schism healed, and sects forgotten and the things of
brass and stone are one with Nineveh and Tyre."
Like the work of many men who reach great heights in their field
of endeavor, there is nothing earthshaking or new in Cardozo's
philosophy or approach to the law. However, there is that clarity
and beauty of language that demonstrate his consummate scholarship,
coupled with the "saving common sense and practical experience, as
well as sound and comprehensive learning" about which his colleague,
Judge Pound, talked, and which give his opinions that persuasive
and inspiring quality.
His great contribution rose out of the combination of a strong inclination toward settling the law in terms of its basic principles and
the awareness of changes in the socio-economic era in which he lived.
His interpretation of the Social Security Act of 1935 (Act of August 14,
1935, c. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U.S.C., c. 7 (Supp.)) demonstrated this
philosophic-pragmatic approach. After deciding in favor of its constitutionality, Cardozo went on to cite the legal proposition that
Congress may spend money in aid of the general welfare, and then said:
There have been great statesmen in our history who have stood
for other views. We will not resurrect the contest. It is now settled
by decision. United States v. Butler (297 U.S. 65) supra. The
conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton and
strongly reinforced by Story has prevailed over that of Madison,
which has not been lacking in adherents. Yet difficulties are left
when the power is conceded. The line must still be drawn between
one welfare and another, between particular and general. Where
this shall be placed cannot be known through a formula in advance of the event. There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large. The discretion, however, is
not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress,
unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power,
not an exercise of judgment. This is now familiar law. 'When such
a contention comes here we naturally require a showing that by
no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within
the wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress.' United
States v. Butler, supra, p. 67 Cf. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, ante, p. 308; United States v. Realty Co., 1963 U.S. 427,
440; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595. Nor is the concept
of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial
a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being
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of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times.
The purge of nation-wide calamity that began in 1929 has
taught us many lessons. Not the least is the solidarity of interests
that may once have seemed to be divided. Unemployment spreads
from State to State, the hinterland now settled that in pioneer
days gave an avenue of escape. Home Building & Loan Assn. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442. Spreading from State to State, unemployment is an ill not particular but general, which may be
checked, if Congress so determines, by the resources of the Nation. If this can have been doubtful until now, our ruling today
in the case of the Steward Machine Co., supra, has set the doubt
at rest. But the ill is all one, or at least not greatly different,
whether men are thrown out of work because there is no longer
work to do or because the disabilities of age make them incapable
of doing it. Rescue becomes necessary irrespective of the cause.
The hope behind this statute is to save men and women from the
rigors of the poor house as well as from the haunting fear that
such a lot awaits them when journey's end is near.
The reader can judge for himself the quality and elegant simplicity
of the language as Cardozo lays down the broad philosophic basis of
a great social principle.
The author pictures Cardozo as an eminent proponent of the realist
movement in the law which insists on freedom from formalism and
less idolatrous devotion to precedent in every case, less emphasis on
legal abstractions and more attention to understandable language in
coincidence to the "push and sweat of life." Cardozo's adherence to
this legal realism is evident in his observation:
We are talking about ourselves and looking into ourselves, subjecting our minds and souls to a process of analysis and introspection with a freedom and in a measure that to the thought of
our predecessors would have been futile and meaningless, or even
downright unbecoming.
Though Cardozo was an exponent of making the law fit the social
conditions, he was not one to overthrow precedent lightly: "What
has once been settled by a precedent, will not be unsettled overnight,
for certainty and uniformity are gains not lightly to be sacrificed.
Above all is this true when honest men have shaped their conduct
upon the faith of the pronouncement." To which statement he added,
however: "On the other hand, conformity is not to be turned into a
fetish."
The author points out that when opportunity afforded and an
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ethical trend was clear, Cardozo did seek to bring the law into accord
with morals. As the exponent of a living law as he conceived it, he
marched "to the time of community justice when its trumpets sound
loud and steady".
Though Cardozo was not hesitant to change the law through his
opinions, there were times when he felt the change required should
be made by the legislature and not by the court. The following cases
serve as examples. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), Cardozo forcefully extended an earlier New
York trend, and held the Buick Company liable to an ultimate buyer
for injuries caused by a defective wheel. A few years later in Glanzer
v. Shepherd, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), a public weigher
was requested by a seller to submit a copy of the finding of weight
to a buyer for his use. In reliance thereon, the buyer overpaid. The
actual weight was less than the weight certified and the weigher was
held responsible to the buyer. Then in the case of Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven and Company, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441
(1931), a public accounting firm was asked to prepare and certify a
balance sheet which the firm knew was to be shown to potential
creditors. Cardozo declined to hold the accountants liable to the creditors for the negligence of an honest blunder. He said that such an
extension of liability
will so expand the field of liability for negligent speech as to
make it nearly, if not quite, coterminous with that of liability for
fraud.... Many pages of opinion were written by judges the most

eminent, yet the word was never spoken. We may not speak it
now. A change so revolutionary, if expedient, must be wrought
by legislation.
There is no doubt that Cardozo's passionate interest in the everyday problems of people, his great scholarship, and his understanding
of the philosophy of the law place him among those men who, in
whatever profession, come too far and few between. He was a man of
intellect and position, yet, as the author points out, he was renowned
for his warmth and amiability and friendliness to those around him.
In the words of the author:
The "stuffed-shirt" formalities which so often accompany success
at the bar are foreign to him. How many distinguished lawyers
would answer a letter of simple inquiry on the day it is received,
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and in their own handwriting? How many can count their corridor acquaintances by the legion?
In short, this is a book that will keep up the interest for those who
like to read about the growth of the law through the great contributions of men who espouse its cause. Certainly the book demonstrates
how Cardozo's moral intelligence, brilliant scholarship, and ability
to communicate legal theory clearly and precisely ensure that his vision
will continue to have a profound impact on the body of American
law. I enthusiastically recommend the reading of this book.
William F. Cercone*
Judge, Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

KEEPING THE PEACE. By Herbert Jenkins. New York:

Harper & Row, 1970. Pp. 203. $5.95.
This may be the best book yet written on modern police problems
by a career police officer. It is brief. It makes no attempt at complete
coverage of the subject. But to me it was considerably more exciting
than its title might imply. It could appropriately be called From Klan
to Kerner Commission. The author, Herbert Jenkins, long-time chief
of police of Atlanta, Georgia, joined the Ku Klux Klan as a routine
aspect of becoming a police officer in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1931. By
1968 the same Herbert Jenkins was one of the important contributing
authors of the "Report of the Presidential Commission on Civil
Disorders," the famed Kerner Report, which is the as yet unexecuted
blueprint for cure to America's racial problems.
Jenkins tells the story of the intervening years with the utmost
simplicity. It is the story of a brave and honest man, forced by the
circumstances of his chosen career in law enforcement, to face and deal
with the complex problems posed by the racial revolution of the midTwentieth Century in America.
Part of the value of the book is that Jenkins started with the racial
biases of the typical white southerner in the 1930's and says so with
the utmost candor. It helps to understand the problem with which he
labored for a lifetime if we read his statement as to why he joined
the Ku Klux Klan:
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In the thirties in Atlanta and throughout the South it was helpful to join the Ku Klux Klan to be an accepted member of the
force. This was your ID card, the badge of honor with the in
group, and it was unfortunately often an allegiance stronger than
the policeman's oath to society.
Not every member of the Atlanta force belonged to the Klan
but those who did not had very little authority or influence. The
Klan was powerful in that it worked behind the scenes with certain members of the Police Committee and the City Council. A
well-liked and respected member of the department who was not
a Klan member could still get promoted through the ranks if supported by the Klan. But as he owed his rank to the Klan he could
never defy them for fear of his job-and his life. The Klan was a
kind of Mafia in dirty sheets.
Anxious for advancement, I joined the
others of my generation of police officers. As
new recruits were gathered up one night
Mountain to take the pledge of allegiance
tional flaming cross.

Klan along with the
a matter of course the
and carried to Stone
in front of the tradi-

This was the extent of my association with the Klan. When
I was told that new members would be assessed $15 for bed sheet
"uniforms" I had nothing further to do with them. I already
wore a uniform and had no intention whatsoever of covering it
with a bed sheet.
And here is the reaction of the young Jenkins to the proposal by a
liberal mayor of Atlanta, for whom as a rookie policemen he then
acted as chauffeur, to hire Negroes in the Atlanta Police Department:
I was thunderstruck at such a suggestion and began to protest
but the Mayor cut me off. He told me that such a thing was not
possible for the present and would only be possible in the future
when the Negro people and white people had been educated to
the idea. He said that he had no doubt that such a thing would
occur in the future and, turning around in his chair and looking
me straight in the eye, said it would occur peaceably only if those
in positions of authority at the time had the wisdom and ability
to make it so.
It might bear noting at this point that three liberal mayors of Atlanta in succession, Mayors Key, Hartsfield and Allen, all made major
contributions to keep Atlanta and its police department in the forefront of American cities in terms of racial progress. The genius of all
three, a genius obviously shared by their police chief, was that they
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tried to lead, and this inevitably meant shaping events rather than
merely reacting to them.
Jenkins does not espouse gradualism as a matter of principle, but
he does portray how Atlanta achieved progress step by step on, for
example, as difficult a problem as integration of the Atlanta police
force, a force which started with eight Negro officers in 1948 and now
has 20% of the force Negro.
When the first Negro officers were hired, they were prohibited by
police regulation from arresting a white person. When Jenkins abolished that regulation, he recalls wryly:
[T]he issue wouldn't die. When the final restrictions on Negro
policemen arresting white persons were officially lifted, some
twelve years after the first employment of Negro police officers,
an irate citizen called me late one night demanding to know how
I would feel if my wife were arrested by a Negro.
"Not very chipper," I replied. "It would be a little discouraging
after all these years to know that my wife had violated the law."
It is obvious that Jenkins did not start with any religious or philosophic background which committed him to the cause of racial justice
and equality. Over and over in relation to various aspects of the race
problem the chapters of the book portray a person of essential decency
and common sense wrestling with the practicalities of a law enforcement problem involving discrimination on a racial basis, and coming
to the conclusion that nothing less than full equality would work.
In the early '60's, called on to enforce state trespass laws against
SNCC sit-ins in lunch counters, Jenkins declined to do so. He stated
his reasons:
Frankly the police had grown weary of fighting over this matter
of segregation and saw little point in operating on the basis of
an elaborate set of state laws which would collapse like a crumbling house of toothpicks before the onslaught of a huffing and
puffing federal judiciary.
*0

*

Therefore, although under great pressure to do otherwise, the
police refused to go along with any further charades enacted to
defend segregation to the end. As a result, when most of the
store managers eventually realized they could not count on the
police to enforce segregation and allow them to continue operating in a segregated manner, they closed down their lunch counters.
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If much of Jenkins' police policy on the race problem was rooted in
pragmatism, by the time President Johnson appointed him a member
of the Kerner Commission, his views appear to have hardened into
conviction:
In Atlanta we have stressed to the men in our department that
they must be color-blind; and it makes no difference what minority group is referred to.
Ultimately separatism based on race simply will not work.
Among other things, it always leads, even without intending to do
so, to the worst kind of violence. The nation will tolerate this for
just so long.
The police have been accused of aggravating and in some cases
causing riots by their intemperate response in tense situations.
I believe the police must bear a part of the blame.
The refusal of the conventional white police force to take the
problems of the ghetto resident seriously is probably the major
cause of rioting. For many years the police have been indifferent,
although not always with malice or premeditation.
While the primary focus of this whole volume is upon police problems arising from the Twentieth Century black revolution, Jenkins
has some perceptive comments on other police related topics. Contrary to most public statements by police administrators, he declines
to blame the Supreme Court for crime increases or for "tying the
hands of the police". Noting that the Supreme Court cases most objected to were really designed to restrain illegal police procedures,
Jenkins comments:
What did this imply about police procedures in the future?
It meant that police would have to investigate more fully, talk
with more witnesses to the crime or people with some knowledge
of the circumstances surrounding the crime. It required that a
person's guilt be established through careful police methods.
As to the impact of these cases, he goes even further:
Does this mean that our arrest record has suffered as a result?
Not at all. Our arrest and "clear-up" record is better than it has
ever been. The Supreme Court decisions have had the effect of
making better policemen out of all of us. We are now doing
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things correctly whereas in the past we might have been haphazard in collecting information and gathering evidence for a case.
(Emphasis in original.)
On the controversial topic of firearms control, Jenkins points out
that of 183 homicides committed in Atlanta in 1968, 128 were committed with firearms; and adds, "If this is not sufficient argument for
some kind of weapons control among the civilian population, I do
not know what is."
In police circles an equally controversial topic is the subject of oneman patrol cars, and Jenkins makes an interesting defense of Atlanta's
use of them:
The department adopted one-man patrol cars for the following
reasons:
1. The record, both local and national, shows that more police
officers are killed in two-man than in one-man patrol cars.
2. A majority of the calls answered by the police do not require
any action by them-merely counseling, giving of advice.
3. When a police officer needs to call for assistance he has twice
the number of units to call on and can get help faster than he
could otherwise.
4. Sound police management requires an officer to do his own
thinking, to use his own initiative and imagination, and to develop
so that each day he does a better job.
5. For the Atlanta police to adopt arbitrarily the two-man
patrol car would cause the number of patrol units and the police
service to be cut in half, or it would require all police personnel
to work seven days per week, instead of five days.
On the deficit side of the ledger I would be inclined to complain
that while Jenkins tells us that Atlanta succeeded in recruiting Negro
citizens to the extent of 20% of Atlanta's police force, he does not go
into the even more interesting question of how this was accomplished.
And while he makes a point that the Klan influence of the '30's has
been in his view eliminated from the Atlanta Police Department, he
leaves the reader who is knowledgeable in such matters eager for him
to write the detailed story of how this result was achieved.
One major omission is the failure to deal with the police problems
produced by organized crime. Conceivably, of course, this might be
because Atlanta had little experience with this phenomenon. If that
were true, how such a desirable result was achieved would be at least
as interesting a story as Atlanta's handling of the race conflict. Maybe
there will be another Jenkins' volume after his retirement.

565

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 9: 566, 1971

On publication of the Kerner Commision report, a fellow citizen of
Atlanta, Dr. Martin Luther King, sent Jenkins a telegram which read:
You, as a member of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders, deserve the gratitude of the nation because you had both
the wisdom to perceive the truth and the courage to state it....
I think that Keeping the Peace is another illustration of Jenkins'
"wisdom to perceive the truth and the courage to state it."
George Edwards*
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

ATTORNEYS' GUIDE TO SELECTIVE SERVICE AND MILITARY
CASE LAW. By Curry First.t Philadelphia: Central Com-

mittee for Conscientious Objectors, 1969. Pp. 187. $3.50.
Supplement, 1970. Pp. 53. $1.75.*
There is no area of legal practice where the need for well-organized
and up-to-date publications is more acute than in selective service law.
The majority of criminal cases now being heard in the federal courts
are alleged selective service violations. Millions of young men are seeking advice relative to personal selective service problems at the administrative level.' Combined with this unprecedented case load, the complex
and highly technical nature of selective service law practice has led to
a state of near confusion. Compounding the confusion is a series of rapid
changes in the law. For example, the past year alone saw the Supreme
Court in Welsh v. United States,2 expand the conscientious objector
classification for thousands of potential applicants, the elimination of
various deferments 3 which had shielded thousands of registrants and the
establishment of a lottery system,' which in itself, is a masterpiece of
t

Member of the Bars of Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Formerly Staff Attorney, Cen-

tral Committee for Conscientious Objectors.
* Available from CCCO, 2016 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19103.
1. The number of appeals to State Appeals Boards rose from 9,741 in 1965 to 117,835
in 1968. 2 SSLR 29.
2. 398 U.S. 333, 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970).
3. Exec. Order No. 11527, amending 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.22(a)(b), 1622.23(a) & 1622.24(a)(b)
(1970).
4. Exec. Order No. 11497, amending 32 C.F.R. § 1631 (1970).
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obfuscation. Pending legislative proposals and judicial decisions promise further disruption of the system. 5
No lawyer taking on a selective service case should be without access
to the Selective Service Law Reporter." This voluminous work contains
the relevant statutes, regulatory materials and recent cases, many of
which are not readily available from other sources. It also features an
extensive and well documented practice manual and a news letter
which highlights recent developments in the field. Although there are
many other publications dealing with selective service law, few of them
are of value to a lawyer who has access to the Selective Service Law
Reporter. For example, a new book entitled "IV-F: A Guide to Draft
Exemption7 contains little that is not found in more definitive form in
the SSLR.
From the viewpoint of the practitioner, the Selective Service Law
Reporter has at least one major weakness. Because it began publication
in 1968, its recent case section contains no court opinions issued prior to
1967. Since its index refers only to materials in the Reporter, its usefulness is limited by the omission of the earlier cases. This inadequacy
is remedied by the Attorneys' Guide to Selective Service and Military
Case Law, a glorious index.
For the practicing draft lawyer, the "Attorneys' Guide" is probably
the only essential supplement to the SSLR; it is certainly the biggest
bargain among selective service books. The heart of the guide is an
outline of selective service and military law. The outline is printed
twice, once in compact form without citations, and again with references
to every relevant section of the Selective Service Act, regulations and
local board memorandums and to every pertinent selective service case.
The Guide also contains two tables of cases, one in alphabetical order
and the other in chronological order. Although in general these tables
are of a dull utilitarian nature, it is interesting to note that the first
case listed is Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863). Curiosity moved me
to the library to read this decision, the only state court case in the list.
In the course of 100 pages of opinions and several months of litigation,
5. E.g., The President has recommended the elimination of student deferments, 2
SSLR 59, and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide whether the prohibition
by the selective service system of legal counsel at personal appearances is valid. Weller v.
United States, 397 U.S. 985 (1970), facts at 309 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Calif. 1969).
6. Available from the Public Law Education Institute, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036. Regular rates: new subscriptions $115/year, renewal subscriptions
$55/year (special rates available to libraries, non profit legal defense organizations, law
students and counselors).
7. D. SuTri.r, IV-F: A GUIDE TO DRAFT EXEMPTION (1970) (paperback $1.50).
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the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the Civil War
draft to be unconstitutional, reversed themselves, and discussed such
related topics as the contumacy of the United States attorney and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Guide is designed for use in litigations rather than in counseling.
Information relating to areas such as medical, student and occupational
deferments is extremely sparse since these subjects are seldom involved
in litigation. For example, the 1-y deferment is represented by only
one entry in the outline (with citations to one regulation and two local
board memoranda) although this deferment is of great importance and
complexity in draft counseling. The brief section on military law also
reflects this emphasis on federal court litigation. It concentrates on subjects such as in-service conscientious objection and the activation of reserve units, omitting the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals and
the innumerable regulations which govern military life.
For the attorney preparing a selective service case for trial, the Guide
provides an invaluable, detailed check list of potential issues. I have
found it worthwhile to re-read the compact version of the outline with
each new selective service case I handle. When an issue is spotted that
is relevant to the materials in a particular registrant's file, it is a simple
matter to brief the issue by referring to the authorities cited in the
Guide. At trial the Guide becomes even more valuable, for it permits
the attorney to assemble a respectable brief on an unexpected issue with
great speed. For example, it is not uncommon for the defense attorney
to be unaware of what evidence the United States attorney may point
to to establish a basis in fact for the denial of a conscientious objector
claim. The Guide lists twenty types of factual circumstances which have
been held not to constitute a rational basis for denial of such a claim.
If, for example, the Government were contending that an expressed
willingness to kill in self-defense constitutes a basis for denial of a conscientious objector claim, the Guide quickly provides two cases in point.
Each time the index number of a case appears in the outline, it is
underlined to indicate whether the registrant was acquitted, convicted,
or granted partial relief. In the heat of trial this leads to a strong temptation to assume that where a case has resulted in acquittal, the court
must have ruled in favor of the registrant with regard to the particular
question under which the case is cited. This is not necessarily so and
the Guide properly warns the reader to turn to the opinion itself. The
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wisdom of this advice is exemplified by the opinion in Petersen v. Clark8
where Judge Zirpoli held in favor of a registrant while, in dicta, rejecting eight defenses. The Guide would be a significantly more useful research tool if it used the underlining system to indicate the way
the court had ruled on each issue.
The Guide deals not only with selective service issues, but also with
questions of procedure that arise in selective service trials. This portion
of the outline contains such fascinating subjects as the nolo contendere
plea, what questions are for the jury, discovery motions, the selective
service file as evidence and the statute of limitations. Some of the entries
in this section, such as the right to subpoena local board members, are
not treated adequately in any other publication on selective service law.
The entries in the area of trial procedure, however, point up a weakness of the Guide. Successful defenses in selective service prosecutions
are dependent, as in no other area save perhaps anti-trust, on the creative use of the law of criminal procedure. Under many of the entries
in the outline it would be extremely helpful to have citations to the
leading authorities, yet the Guide cites only cases which are concerned
with the selective service act. To add this broader range of authorities
to the outline would be a monumental task, and it would be an act of
ingratitude to fault the author of such a comprehensive work for failing to take on this additional chore. However, the attorney who uses the
Attorneys' Guide to Selective Service and Military Case Law should be
forewarned that there still is no substitute for hard work and that total
reliance on the Guide and the SSLR may be inadequate.
Gilbert T. Venable**
8. 285 F. Supp. 700, 289 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Calif. 1968), rev'd, 411 F.2d 1217 (9th
Cir- 1969).
** Assistant dean, Arizona State University School of Law.
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By Joseph L. Abraham.

Chicago, Ill., Commerce Clearing House, 1970. Pp. xii,
299. $12.50.
"Frankly, whether or not it will be entirely fruitful lies to a large
extent in your hands." These words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt from his last speech to the Congress of the United States might
well be the epigraph for the federal truth in lending statute., The
consumers of the United States must be the ultimate judge of the value
of this statute. The tentative conclusion of the reviewer is that the
statute, at least in the field of real estate lending, has not yet accomplished what it is presumed its authors hoped to accomplish.
This is by way of introduction to a discussion of Joseph L. Abraham's book Truth in Real Estate Lending, which is a survey of the
federal truth in lending statute as it pertains to real estate. The
bulk of the book is devoted to paraphrasing either the statute or Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board 2 or commenting on some of the
rulings issued by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board or the Fedeial
Trade Commission. This is not to say that the author has not done the
best that he can with the material which is available. He himself points
out that there have been no court cases to speak of in the field.
He has not attempted to write the only other type of book that possibly could have been written, namely, an actual survey of how lenders
and borrowers have reacted, the various problems they have encountered, including in that category the methods which have been
used by various lending institutions to solve the mechanical and legal
problems which have been raised by the existence of the act.
In some of the specific areas of doubt created either by the statute,
the regulations or the interpretations the author's position seems most
conservative 'as befits the newness of this law. As an example he points
out the peculiarity of holding a real estate broker not to be an "arranger" of credit even when he prepares an "application" for a loan
which is converted into a contract upon its acceptance by the lender.3
The staff of the Federal Reserve Board has held that the "contract"
documents required to be prepared before a real estate broker can be
held to be an "arranger" of credit are the security instruments themselves. As the author points out, this does have the virtue of practicality,
1. 82 Stat. 146, et seq; 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1665.
2. 12 CFR 226.
3. J. Abraham, Truth in Real Estate Lending, 18 (1970).
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but it might not appeal to a court in the light of one of the avowed
purposes of the act, namely, to bring to the consumer's attention all
those who either directly or indirectly are involved in the credit extension.
Certain of the author's interpretations, however, seem to be unduly
strained and not warranted by any opinions issued by the enforcement
agencies. For example, his position on the responsibility of a lender
who bids in the property at the foreclosure sale and subsequently sells
it, taking back a purchase money mortgage, is that if the lender does
this with any "regularity" he becomes a creditor merely because of his
credit sale activities. 4 He goes further and indicates that the foreclosure
under a power of sale may be a credit transaction when the property
is bid in by a third party who defers all or part of the purchase price.
These statements seem to disregard the purpose of the statute entirely.
It was intended to protect consumers and not sophisticated purchasers
at foreclosure sales.
Appropriately the author refers in several different sections to the
problem of "consummation" and the method to be used to establish
the fact that a loan transaction has been "consummated" according to
the requirements of Regulation Z. 5 Since this is of crucial significance
for both the disclosure and rescission requirements, it is good to have
Mr. Abraham reaffirm one's own judgment that the issuance of commitment letters by lenders is to be encouraged since the acceptance of
such written commitments by borrowers goes a long way in fixing with
precision the time elements required in both disclosure and rescission.
More importantly, it also accomplishes the goal of the statute, that is,
the giving of the requisite information to the consumer to allow him
to opt out prior to committing himself irrevocably to the transaction.
The book performs the service of pulling together the statute, the
regulations and some of the more interesting opinions issued by the
enforcement agencies. It must be said however, that at the present time
the practitioner who encounters problems of more than an elementary
nature in the applicability of the statute to real estate would be welladvised to make liberal use of one of the loose-leaf services which contain the important opinions issued by the staff of the Federal Reserve
Board since the factual distinctions in this field are of exceptional
importance.
4.
5.

Id. 23.
Id. 78, 170, 209.
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The philosophical implications of the truth in lending statute both
with respect to its economic cost and its effect on the consumer are not
within the ambit of Mr. Abraham's book. One cannot refrain, however,
from commenting that while no responsible participant in the field of
real estate could possibly object to the goal of full disclosure, it seems
clear, after some experience with the statute and the regulations, that
the emphasis on form over substance is not really accomplishing the
goal Congress intended. The consumer of real estate financing does
not seem to be any better informed as to his interest cost than before.
This is primarily due to the fact that the real estate lending industry
had always itemized charges although it had not converted lump sum
charges to an annualized rate. Whether the consumer is better informed by such conversion is questionable. The opposite effect is more
probable since the customer now is told that the interest rate is substantially higher than the rate his mortgage carries. This has proved
to be confusing to most borrowers.
In summary the book discusses some of the problems raised by the
new statute and might prove an appropriate starting place for the
practitioner who is confronted with a problem in the field.
Raymond A. Jensen*
Member, Bar of Illinois.
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